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15	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
16	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
17	SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION	
18	ORACLE AMERICA, INC.,	Case No. 3:10-cv-03651 WHA
19	Plaintiff,	GOOGLE INC.'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS
20	v.	OF DR. JAMES KEARL'S EXPERT REPORT
21	GOOGLE INC.,	
22	Defendant.	Dept.: Courtroom 8, 19th Floor Judge: Hon. William Alsup
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on April 9, 2012, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, Defendant Google Inc. ("Google") will, and hereby does, respectfully move to exclude portions of the opinions and testimony of Dr. James Kearl. This Motion is based on the following memorandum of points and authorities in support, the Declaration of Daniel Purcell ("Purcell Decl.") and accompanying exhibits, the entire record in this matter, and on such evidence as may be presented at the hearing of this Motion. Dated: April 2, 2012 KEKER & VAN NEST LLP /s/ Robert A. Van Nest ROBERT A. VAN NEST By: Attorneys for Defendant GOOGLE INC.

GOOGLE'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF KEARL REPORT Case No. 3:10-CV-03561 WHA

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15	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
16	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
17	SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION	
18	ORACLE AMERICA, INC.,	Case No. 3:10-cv-03651 WHA
19	Plaintiff,	GOOGLE'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
20	V.	ITS MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF DR. JAMES KEARL'S EXPERT REPORT
21	GOOGLE INC.,	
22	Defendant.	Dept.: Courtroom 8, 19th Floor Judge: Hon. William Alsup
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At his deposition last week, the Court's appointed Rule 706 damages expert, Dr. James R. Kearl, acknowledged that one narrow aspect of his expert opinion is inconsistent with governing law (and this Court's prior orders) regarding the requirement that a reasonable royalty be based only on the intellectual property at issue in this case. Accordingly, Google files this conditional and limited motion to strike to confirm that Dr. Kearl will not be allowed to offer such testimony in the damages phase of trial.

In his March 20, 2012 report, Dr. Kearl began his damages calculation (as Oracle's expert Dr. Iain Cockburn had done) by looking at the 2006 negotiations between Sun and Google for a technology partnership including a bundle of intellectual-property rights. Dr. Kearl calculated the percentage of the value of the total 2006 Sun bundle attributable to the intellectual property in suit: the '104 patent (2.38% of the total bundle), the '520 patent (.07% of the bundle), and the 37 purportedly copyrighted API packages (together 1.9% of the bundle). Kearl Report ¶ 111 & n.63; id. at Table 7. Google is not moving to strike Dr. Kearl's apportionment analysis.

But before apportioning the bundle, Dr. Kearl also opined that, as a matter of economics, no apportionment is appropriate, and that Google should be charged a royalty for the entire bundle—not merely the intellectual property in suit. Kearl Report ¶¶ 97-105.

Id. ¶ 99.

Id. Dr. Kearl opined that, if Google knew during the 2006 negotiations which of the Sun patents and copyrights ultimately would be useful to Android, the negotiation over the bundle would really have been a negotiation over that specific IP. (There is no evidence that Google knew anything specific about the contents of the Sun bundle in 2006, and Dr. Kearl cites none.) Alternatively, Dr. Kearl opined that, if Google did not know which of the Sun patents and copyrights would be useful to Android, it may have wanted to keep open multiple options as to how to design Android or to buy insurance against future infringement claims by Sun. Id. ¶¶ 100-103.

the requirements of the law and the Court's prior orders:

1 2 Id. ¶ 104 (emphases added).

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At deposition, Dr. Kearl readily conceded that his economic judgment was in tension with

Purcell Decl. Ex. A (Kearl Depo.) at 157:7-158:6 (emphases added).

Indeed, the Court previously disapproved of exactly this same reasoning when Oracle and Dr. Cockburn employed it in their first damages report last summer. There, Dr. Cockburn calculated damages for Google's purported use of "Java," without separating out the asserted patents and copyrights from the remainder of Oracle's various Java platforms not at issue. The Court rejected that sort of broad-brush analysis, ruling that it "runs afoul of controlling law." July 22, 2011 Order [Dkt. 230] at 5.

The reasonable royalty to be calculated is "a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer." 35 U.S.C. 248 (emphasis added). Java was not the invention. Only the claims asserted were the invention.

Therefore, the hypothetical license must be limited to the asserted claims excluding the rest of the Java platform. That "[t]he intellectual property at issue here was generally bundled into the technologies that Sun licensed on a portfolio

basis" because "Sun's practice was to license Java, not to license individual patents," does not change this statutory requirement (Weingaertner Exh. A at ¶ 132). An opinion that the hypothetical negotiation would have resulted in a Java license simply fights the hypothetical.

July 22, 2011 Order [Dkt. 230] at 5-6 (emphases in original).

Not only does section 248 require that any reasonable royalty be tied to "the use made of the invention" at issue in the case, myriad federal appellate opinions bar plaintiffs from recovering damages for related or ancillary intellectual property that is not asserted in litigation or used by the defendant. Two years ago, in RestONet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010), the Federal Circuit held that "[a]t all times, the damages inquiry must concentrate on compensation for the economic harm caused by infringement of the claimed invention." Id. at 869 (emphasis added). In its July 22, 2011 Order, the Court cited this language from *RestONet*, explaining that the Federal Circuit meant that "[t]he hypothetical license therefore must be tailored to the amount and type of infringement that actually occurred" and that "[t]he reasonable royalty must compensate for the infringing features, but not for non-infringing ones." July 22, 2011 Order [Dkt. 230] at 8 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (hypothetical negotiation analysis must "elucidate how the parties would have valued *the patented feature* during the hypothetical negotiation") (emphasis added); Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1159 (6th Cir. 1978) ("the relevant facts" in a hypothetical negotiation analysis include (1) "what plaintiff's property was"; (2) "to what extent defendant has taken it"; and (3) "its usefulness and commercial value as shown by its advantages over other things and by the extent of its use").

The Court reaffirmed this analysis in its January 9, 2012 Order partially granting Google's motion to strike the second Cockburn report, making clear that "[i]f the \$100 million offer in 2006 is used as the starting point," as Dr. Kearl has also done here, "then a fair apportionment of the \$100 million as between the technology in suit and the remainder of the technology then offered must be made." Jan. 9, 2012 Order [Dkt. 685] at 8. Similarly, the Court's March 13, 2012 Order partially granting Google's motion to strike the third Cockburn's report also required apportionment and struck aspects of Dr. Cockburn's report for apportionment problems. Mar. 13,

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1 2012 Order [Dkt. 785] at 3-5 (striking the upper bound of Dr. Cockburn's apportionment under a 2 "group-and-value approach"); id. at 10-11 (requiring deduction from total value of 2006 Sun 3 bundle to account for value of unasserted copyrights); id. at 11-13 (striking Dr. Cockburn's 4 "independent significance approach" for failing to follow the apportionment guidelines in January 5 9, 2012 Order). 6 The opinions in paragraphs 97 through 105 of Dr. Kearl's report are inconsistent with the 7 law and this Court's orders. To the extent Dr. Kearl plans to offer them at trial, they would be 8 only confusing, not helpful, to the jury in calculating a legally permissible measure of damages in 9 this case. Google respectfully asks the Court to exclude those opinions.

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11 Dated: April 2, 2012

KEKER & VAN NEST LLP

By:

/s/ Robert A. Van Nest ROBERT A. VAN NEST

Attorneys for Defendant GOOGLE INC.

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